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Introduction
In June of 1816, in a villa on the shores
of Lake Geneva, Mary Godwin and three
friends were kept inside by what she called
as a ‘‘wet, ungenial summer.’’ The thun-
derstorms and ‘‘incessant rain’’ she de-
scribed were not a normal spell of bad
weather, however. A year earlier, the
eruption of Mount Tambora in Indonesia,
the largest of the modern era, had thrown
over one hundred million tonnes of
sulphur dioxide into the mid stratosphere
[1]. The sulphur dioxide reacted with
atmospheric water and oxygen to produce
a sulphate layer that was dispersed around
the globe, dimming the incoming sunlight
and leading to what became known as
‘‘the year without a summer’’ [2]. The
failures of harvests led to food riots
throughout Europe [3].
Mary Godwin went on to marry Percy
Shelley, one of the other guests of the villa.
The book she began writing that summer,
the introduction of which contains the
author’s reflections on the bad weather
that forced her to stay inside, became
Frankenstein [4]. The thunderstorms she
experienced became part of the dramatic
backdrop for her story of a scientific
experiment that gave birth to a monster
[5].
Such climatic disruption has inspired
scientific as well as literary insight. In June
1991 the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo her-
alded a new understanding of the climatic
impacts of large volcanic eruptions. An
injection five or six times smaller than
Tambora [6] still managed to exert
considerable influence on global climate,
cooling the Earth by an average of about
0.5uC for about 2 years [7], with impacts
on storms, rainfall, and international
conflict [8]. The eruption was the first of
its size observed by satellites, facilitating a
quantum leap in our understanding of
how volcanoes influence climate. Obser-
vation and quantification of the way that
large volcanic eruptions reduce global
temperatures by dimming sunlight has
prompted some to suggest that there might
be ways to artificially engineer this effect in
order to counteract global warming [9].
This proposal, known as stratospheric
particle injection, fits under the banner of
geoengineering, defined by the Royal
Society as ‘‘the deliberate large-scale
manipulation of the planetary environ-
ment to counteract anthropogenic climate
change’’ [10]. More specifically, it is an
example of a subset of geoengineering
proposals known as solar radiation man-
agement (SRM). Geoengineering propos-
als have a long history, dating back at least
to the Cold War, and longer if one
considers attempts at local weather mod-
ification [11]; but there has been a recent
and dramatic revival of scientific and
policy interest, as awareness of the scale
of climate change risks has become more
pronounced [12].
In this paper, we reflect on our
involvement in one of the first major
SRM research projects, SPICE (Strato-
spheric Particle Injection for Climate
Engineering). We look back on recent
public engagement with biotechnologies,
to compare this with our own stakeholder
engagement work. Questions to do with
the context and wider purposes of scien-
tific research emerge as important, but
these are conventionally neglected in
governance.
Questioning Emerging Technologies
In the 200 years since it was written,
Frankenstein has become the preeminent
parable of technology-out-of-control. The
Frankenstein myth looms over biotechnol-
ogy and the biosciences in particular
because it concerns the creation and
manipulation of life. But its resonance
goes well beyond the biosciences. The
story reflects societal unease about the
tension between innovation and responsi-
bility. Its name is invoked in popular
criticisms of technologies (‘‘Frankenstein
food’’ or, more recently, ‘‘Frankenstein
Fish’’) and scientific irresponsibility.
Each new technology brings unique
possibilities, challenges, and dilemmas.
Technologies have different technical
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implications and different ‘‘social constitu-
tions’’ [13]. And yet there are lessons from
past technologies that we can apply to
those currently emerging [14]. There are
ways in which the social, political, and
ethical concerns that may come to govern
their emergence can be anticipated
[15,16].
The progress of biotechnology brings
the potential for ever more intimate and
disruptive interventions into human bodies
and the natural environment. As previous
papers in this series have described, there
have been various attempts, especially in
the last decade, to improve engagement
between scientists and public groups on
issues involving biotechnology [17]. En-
gagement exercises, whether with particu-
lar non-science stakeholders or members
of the general public, reveal layers of
societal concern with these technologies.
There is typically concern with the
eventual downstream risks and the ethical
implications of technologies. But these
things are hard to assess in advance due
to the profound uncertainty that surrounds
emerging technology. Public engagement
typically also reveals a set of ‘‘upstream’’
concerns [18].
When brought into dialogue about
emerging technologies, before it is clear
what the risks are likely to be, members of
the public will typically express concern
about the trajectory of technological
pathways. A report of one large public
dialogue exercise on Synthetic Biology
[19] drew out five questions for scientists
that characterised public concerns about
this nascent technology:
N What is the purpose?
N Why do you want to do it?
N What are you going to gain from it?
N What else is it going to do?
N How do you know you are right?
These questions get to the heart of the
politics of emerging technologies and the
foundations of public trust in scientific
research. Conventional technology assess-
ment considers the downstream products
of research and innovation with a focus on
technological risk and ethics [20]. More
recent anticipatory governance approach-
es, such as ‘‘constructive technology as-
sessment’’ [16], ‘‘real-time technology
assessment’’ [15], and ‘‘responsible inno-
vation’’ [21], attempt to broaden the
debate to include consideration of the
processes and purposes of research, in line
with the five questions above. Such
approaches emphasise the importance of
democratic deliberation in ‘‘opening up’’
the technological options and trajectories
for appraisal [22]. Geoengineering in
general and the SPICE project in partic-
ular have become important test cases for
this new mode of governance [23].
Anticipatory governance demands a
focus on the trajectories of technology,
even if those trajectories are highly
uncertain. As one of the first major
research projects explicitly looking at
geoengineering, the SPICE team are
concerned about the long-term unintend-
ed consequences of our research. There is
a risk that any research project that focuses
on a particular technology contributes to
‘‘locking in’’ [24,25] that option to the
detriment of other options, including non-
technological ones. The SPICE project
follows an apparent, if unintended, favour-
itism towards stratospheric aerosols by the
Royal Society in its influential report on
geoengineering (Figure 1).
Stratospheric aerosol injection was de-
termined to be the fastest, most effective,
and cheapest geoengineering option, but
also, when compared with Carbon Diox-
ide Removal, more potentially dangerous.
Such assessments are crucially dependent
on framing assumptions, some of which
were indicated by the Royal Society [10],
and characterised by profound uncertain-
ty. Given this uncertainty, there is a
danger of social science and engagement
engaging in ‘‘speculative ethics,’’ treating
the technology and its implications as fully
formed [26]. So while there is a clear
opportunity for SPICE to provide an
opportunity for public and stakeholder
engagement, engagement should not be
considered to be a neutral exercise [27].
SPICE and Stakeholder Engagement
SPICE is a multidisciplinary research
project aiming to investigate the possible
benefits, risks, costs, and feasibility of solar
radiation management by injecting reflec-
tive particles into the stratosphere. It is one
of the first large SRM research projects
anywhere in the world, and the first to
propose an outdoor experiment. This
‘‘testbed’’ component was designed to
investigate the dynamics of a tethered-
balloon delivery system.
Recent reports from the Royal Society
and others explain the scientific, social,
and political complexity of geoengineering
[10,28,29]. Scientists evaluating proposed
geoengineering approaches have pointed
to the possible problems that we might
anticipate and others about which we are
hugely uncertain [30]. Nevertheless, it is
argued that the risks of not knowing
whether and how geoengineering might
work outweigh the risks associated with
embarking on a research program [31–
33], the latter including the possibility of
distracting political attention away from
climate change mitigation efforts [10].
This is in part why such emphasis has
been placed on governing the technology
before it is fully-formed [34].
The testbed proposed as part of the
SPICE project (Figure 2) attracted sub-
stantial attention from interest groups,
mainstream news, and specialist scientific
media. It acted to raise the profile of
geoengineering in the public sphere and
the resulting debate can productively be
viewed as a form of ‘‘informal technology
assessment’’ [35]. The SPICE team,
following discussion with an external
‘‘stage-gate’’ panel [36], sought and at-
tempted to understand a wide range of
responses to their proposed research.
In order to understand the nature of these
concerns and learn lessons for the gover-
nance of geoengineering research, a pro-
gramme of stakeholder engagement took
place, involving 29 qualitative interviews
(ranging from 30 minutes to 2 hours) with
civil society organisation (environmental or
humanitarian non-governmental organisa-
tion [NGO]) representatives (n=12),
Summary
In this paper, we reflect on our involvement in one of the first major research
projects in the emerging area of geoengineering (the deliberate intervention in
the planetary climate). The project, Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate
Engineering (SPICE), proposed an outdoor experiment that attracted substantial
public scrutiny despite a strong consensus that the experiment posed no direct
environmental risk. A programme of stakeholder engagement took place that
sought a deep understanding of the views about the proposed experiment. The
lessons from this experiment build on insights from public engagement with the
biosciences and biotechnology. In particular, we see the importance of questions
of context and purpose for scientific research. This has important implications for
the governance of geoengineering research. Efforts to detach areas of research
from public scrutiny by using thresholds, whether these are drawn at a particular
level of environmental effect or at the doors of a laboratory, will encounter
problems of public credibility. Geoengineering is unavoidably entangled in a
political discussion that scientists should seek to understand and engage with.
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scientists (n=11), and other actors (n=6),
and a workshop at which 15 participants
(seven from NGOs and eight scientists and
others) openly shared and discussed their
concerns. The stakeholders were selected in
order to provide a range of critical but
constructive views on the SPICE project,
with an initial sample ‘‘snowballed’’ [37] to
form the larger group of recommended
participants. This research should therefore
be taken neither as quantitative nor as
representative of a broader public view of
SPICE or geoengineering. (Additional de-
liberative public engagement work has been
conducted with respect to SPICE [38,39]).
The views of these stakeholders suggest that
the big questions that characterise debates
over genetically modified organisms and
synthetic biology are pertinent too for
geoengineering. In the sections that follow,
quotations are taken from the interviews and
workshop without attribution or coding, so
as to maintain the anonymity of the
participants.
‘‘The Imaginary Made Real’’: Insights
From Stakeholder Engagement
Among the stakeholders around the
SPICE project, there was a surprising
degree of consensus about two things: first,
that the SPICE testbed did not in itself
pose direct environmental risks and, sec-
ond, that it was nonetheless contentious
and deserving of further deliberation. As
we will describe in this paper’s conclusion,
this has important implications for gover-
nance.
Asked to explain what concerned them
about the testbed, most stakeholders
identified a troubling wider vision of the
future:
‘‘It’s the imaginary made real.’’
‘‘We weren’t concerned about the direct
impacts of that experiment, it was the role it
plays in developing the technology and
bringing forward the day on which the
technology will be deployed.’’
‘‘The trial wasn’t risky, but it was being
done for a reason, and the reason is risky…
It was clear that this wasn’t pure research.
The purpose was the problem.’’
‘‘One question that is too infrequently asked
is ‘why?’ It’s not a specific concern about
the impacts of any one experiment. It’s a
concern about the implications of those
experiments.’’
‘‘The purpose of the experiment is to try to
figure out how to blast a material into some
part of the atmosphere… the whole purpose
of the experiment is to deploy geoengineering.’’
The last three comments reveal a
concern with the purposes of research that
is hard to account for in current gover-
nance. Geoengineering, unlike previous
emerging technologies such as nanotech-
nology and synthetic biology, is defined by
its intent, its statement of purpose. So
whereas with nanotechnology it has prov-
en hard to deliberate on upstream ques-
tions of purpose [40], geoengineering
presents the opportunity for a more
constructive discussion.
There is an acute awareness, displayed
in the first two comments above, that
research could be a step onto a slippery
slope. Dale Jamieson, in an early reflec-
tion on the ethics of geoengineering,
warns that ‘‘researching a technology
risks inappropriately developing it. Often
we think of research as being quite
independent of development. Unfortu-
nately this often is not true. In many
cases research leads unreflectively to
development’’ [41, p. 333] (see also
[42]). Stakeholders are therefore watch-
ful of any interests or commitments that
might lead to technological ‘‘lock-in.’’ In
Figure 1. Preliminary overall evaluation of geoengineering techniques [10, p. 49].
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001707.g001
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Figure 2. Proposed SPICE testbed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001707.g002
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the case of SPICE, the issue of intellec-
tual property became an important
consideration. A patent application re-
lating to the balloon technology, on
which two SPICE researchers, despite
not holding intellectual property them-
selves, were listed as inventors, was made
prior to the launch of the project. This
coloured the views of some stakeholders:
‘‘It isn’t just a balloon in the air any more
when the patent ties it explicitly to
geoengineering.’’
Such concerns are predicated on an
assumption that a particular geoengineer-
ing research project cannot be divorced
from its political context. Research into
technologies for geoengineering and the
physical impacts of climate modification
cannot, in the minds of many stakeholders,
be conducted independently of the socio-
political issues around technological de-
ployment:
‘‘In geoengineering research, context is
everything. You know I don’t think there
is a way round that. You know these are
such big questions and the implications of
deploying a geoengineering technique are so
enormous.’’
The SPICE researchers and their fun-
ders have come to terms with these
implications via invited and uninvited
engagement with various public groups.
After initially proposing the testbed, and
then having it postponed by the project’s
funders while stakeholder engagement
work took place, the SPICE team took
the decision not to proceed with the
experiment, given the gaps in governance
and uncertainties about intellectual prop-
erty [43]. This decision prompted sub-
stantial debate and reflection in the media,
within the SPICE team and among others





Until recently, it was relatively easy to
categorise geoengineering research as
what historian James Fleming calls ‘‘geo-
scientific speculation’’ [11]. Following
some prominent scientific and policy
interventions, geoengineering has rapidly
become a policy issue and a research
agenda. In addition to computer model-
ling and laboratory studies, some SRM
researchers are now proposing outdoor
experiments [46]. On the Carbon Diox-
ide Removal side of geoengineering, a few
controversial experiments in the open
environment have already taken place
[47,48]. Other scientists suggest that these
are premature, that research should stay
indoors until we know more [49]. Discus-
sions that have taken place under the
aegis of the Solar Radiation Management
Governance Initiative (an offshoot of the
Royal Society report) suggest that con-
sensus on this should not be expected
soon.
Despite the absence of a direct climatic
effect, the proposed SPICE testbed would
have been a symbolic step in the direction
of outdoor experimentation. Any outdoor
experiments designed to test the efficacy or
implications of geoengineering would in-
volve some level of deployment of a
technology. And, in the event of a future
decision to deploy a technology to cool the
earth, the huge uncertainties involved
mean that the deployment would itself be
experimental [50,51]. With SPICE, stake-
holders’ concerns are less with the present
circumstances of the testbed experiment
and more with the steps that might be
taken beyond it.
Research and innovation are conven-
tionally governed by two main regimes of
regulation, those of risk and ethics. The
machinery for governing these things is
well-established. We have risk assessments,
risk registers, and processes for risk
management, including the precautionary
principle for areas in which risks are not
well-defined. Similarly, ethics committees
at universities, hospitals, and other places
where research takes place are designed to
safeguard the rights of participants.
Among the stakeholders, SPICE was
considered relatively benign on the
grounds of both risk and ethics. There
was a consensus that the risks of the
testbed were trivial and it was approved by
research ethics committees of the univer-
sities involved subject to its safety and
legality. And yet the project has generated
substantial controversy. We have argued
in this paper that this controversy has been
useful, as a pointer towards wider concerns
about geoengineering.
SPICE therefore provides an indication
of the limits of governance. The sorts of
insights typically revealed by public en-
gagement can be hard to build into a
regulatory framework, and we lack a
framework for consideration of the sort
of ‘‘public ethics’’ [52] issues presented by
geoengineering proposals. As geoengineer-
ing research gathers pace, however, it is
vital to consider how governance might
become more ‘‘socially robust’’ [53].
There is a choice between detachment
and entanglement.
The growth of geoengineering research
has been accompanied by calls for gover-
nance. Much of the time, ‘‘governance’’ is
interpreted in the hard, regulatory sense of
prohibition. Here, scientific freedom or
the ‘‘right to research’’ [54] is interpreted
in the sense of freedom from interference,
what Isaiah Berlin calls ‘‘negative liberty.’’
The approach suggested by Parson and
Keith in a recent paper in Science argues for
an experimental threshold [46]. Their
suggestion is that, above a certain upper
limit (where there is a discernable effect on
the environment), there should be a ban
on geoengineering experiments. They also
suggest a lower limit, beneath which
experiments should be allowed to take
place unfettered. Others have proposed an
indoor/outdoor divide [29,49], with the
premise that indoor activities are ethically
justifiable, while activities outside the
laboratory demand additional scrutiny.
These are two arguments for detachment.
We have seen through the SPICE project
that such an attempt to cordon off
research from public attention will be
problematic, not least because there will
be substantial disagreement about where
the threshold should lie. Outdoor experi-
ments that do not perturb the environ-
ment cannot be considered to be immune
from potential controversy and isolated
from the socio-political issues relating to
deployment. Nor is indoor research insu-
lated from the political and ethical discus-
sion. Scientifically defined thresholds for
public scrutiny, whether they are placed at
particular levels of radiative forcing or at
the doors of a laboratory, will not in
themselves command public credibility. As
Brown and Guston describe, there is
another interpretation of the ‘‘right to
research’’ that is more democratic and
seeks engagement between research, pol-
itics, and the public rather than detach-
ment [54].
One of the major lessons of public
engagement with biotechnologies has
been that purposes matter. Why some-
thing is being researched or developed is
an issue of substantial public interest.
Research is situated in, and inextricable
from, its wider social context [55]. The
SPICE project has been explicit about its
connections with geoengineering. It has
therefore attracted a good deal of
attention. Other projects have engaged
with geoengineering more obliquely,
informing geoengineering research while
ostensibly labelling themselves as climate
science. By way of comparison, we might
point to the E-PEACE project, which has
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taken place over a similar timescale to
SPICE and involves an outdoor experi-
ment in cloud formation. The E-PEACE
project has clear relevance to geoengi-
neering research but has not labelled
itself as a geoengineering research proj-
ect, so has avoided some of the attention
attracted by SPICE.
The discussion and governance of
purposes will be difficult, as Parson and
Keith describe [46]. Emerging technolo-
gies can readily be reclassified as mundane
if there is a fear of burdensome regulation
[56]. But that should not stop us from
attempting to improve the responsible
governance of science. Rather than pre-
supposing some unhelpful dichotomies,
between science and society, between
innovators and regulators, we could in-
stead look to continued discussions among
scientists and publics as a basis for
governance, understood broadly to en-
compass the norms, cultures, and practices
of science.
SPICE and other geoengineering pro-
jects are unavoidably entangled in the
politics of geoengineering. Rather than
seeking to escape these entanglements
[57], scientists can instead try to under-
stand and work with them, through
processes of public and stakeholder en-
gagement. The SPICE team, over a series
of several months, have been through a
programme of governance and engage-
ment, including the ‘‘stage-gate’’ process
imposed by the project’s funders, the UK
Research Councils, requiring substantial
effort and occasional discomfort, but this
has been ultimately worthwhile. Re-
searchers’ involvement in politicised is-
sues involving emerging technologies
demands consideration of new responsi-
bilities, some of which have been im-
posed upon SPICE and some of which
SPICE have invited. According to Bruno
Latour, the story of Frankenstein offers a
lesson here:
‘‘Dr Frankenstein’s crime was not
that he invented a creature through
some combination of hubris and
high technology, but rather that he
abandoned the creature to itself.’’
[58]
Within geoengineering research, sci-
entists are wrestling with the tangle of
politics and ethics in which their work
takes place. Scientists have been aware
of the political discussion associated with
geoengineering, but have understood
and engaged with questions of responsi-
bility in different ways. In 2009, a
scientific conference at Asilomar began
discussions on self-governance that were
subsequently taken on by the Solar
Radiation Management Governance
Initiative [59,60]. The Oxford principles
for geoengineering governance have
provided an initial basis for these
discussions [61]. But there remains a
gap between these abstract norms and
the practice of research. The SPICE
experience suggests that, while science
cannot set the terms for public and
stakeholder debate, history and public
engagement can attune scientists to the
questions that are overlooked in discus-
sions focussing on risk. Scientists in
areas of emerging science and technol-
ogy are well-placed to initiate such a
dialogue. But the responsibility should
not fall on their shoulders alone. Re-
sponsible governance demands mean-
ingful, early collaboration with social
scientists and ethicists. Crucially, insti-
tutions, including research funders, must
also take active responsibility for their
own decisions.
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